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The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion

Published in Emotion Review. 2010, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 44-52
Abstract Taking our lead from Solomon's emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism's life.
Keywords ConstructivismEmbodimentEmotionIntentionality
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Research groups Affective sciences
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DEONNA, Julien, SCHERER, Klaus R. The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. In: Emotion Review, 2010, vol. 2, n° 1, p. 44-52. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:89053

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Deposited on : 2016-11-17

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