Scientific article
English

The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion

Published in

Emotion review, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 44-52

Publication date

2010

Abstract

Taking our lead from Solomon's emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists (in particular Barrett) seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not qualify as intentional. We argue that these disappearing acts, deliberate or not, generate fruitless debate and add little to the advancement of our understanding of emotion as an adaptive mechanism to cope with events that are relevant to an organism's life.

Keywords

  • Constructivism
  • Embodiment
  • Emotion
  • Intentionality

UNIGE research groups

Citation (ISO format)

DEONNA, Julien, SCHERER, Klaus R. The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. In: Emotion review, 2010, vol. 2, n° 1, p. 44–52. doi: 10.1177/1754073909345544

Main files (1)

Article (Published version)

Identifiers

Journal ISSN

1754-0739
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Technical informations

Creation

16/11/2016 16:10:00

First validation

16/11/2016 16:10:00

Update

15/03/2023 00:56:47

Status update

15/03/2023 00:56:47

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