Book chapter (Published version) (224 Kb) - Limited access to UNIGE
Other version: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199686094.001.0001/acprof-9780199686094
In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?
|Published in||Roeser, S. & Todd, C. Emotion and Value: Oxford University Press. 2014|
|Abstract||Why think that emotions are kinds of evaluations? This chapter puts forward an original account of emotions as evaluations apt to circumvent some of the chief difficulties with which alternative approaches find themselves confronted. We shall proceed by first introducing the idea that emotions are evaluations (sec. I). Next, two well-known approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are in and of themselves unemotional but are alleged to become emotional when directed towards evaluative contents are explored. According to the first approach, emotions are nothing but evaluative judgments. Sec. II reminds the reader of the problems associated with this idea: one of its consequences is to deprive creatures with limited cognitive capacities of any sort of partaking of emotional life. According to the second approach, which is often praised for its capacity to avoid the pitfalls facing an appeal to evaluative judgments, emotions are perception-like experiences of evaluative properties and are as such within the reach of creatures bereft of conceptual capacities. This perceptual theory is taken up in sect. III, in which we explain why it remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that what makes emotions evaluations is the specific contents that they have. On this basis, we proceed by outlining in sect. IV an alternative—the attitudinal theory of emotions. Its main point of departure from current theorizing about the emotions consists in elucidating the fact that emotions are evaluations not in terms of what they represent, but rather in terms of the sort of attitude subjects take towards what they represent. We explore here what sorts of attitudes emotions are and defend the idea that they are felt bodily attitudes.|
|Keywords||Emotion — Value — Philosophy of Mind|
|Research groups||Affective sciences|
|DEONNA, Julien, TERONI, Fabrice. In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?. In: Roeser, S. & Todd, C. (Ed.). Emotion and Value. [s.l.] : Oxford University Press, 2014. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:89488|