Report
OA Policy
English

In Search of Market Access: Why the Doha “Plan B” for December 2011 is likely to fail Effective Market Access (Part I)

Mandator

Fondation pour les Études et Recherches sur le Développement International

Number of pages

6

Publisher

Clermont-Ferrand : Fondation pour les Études et Recherches sur le Développement International

Collection

  • FERDI, Policy Brief; B 24.1

Publication date

2011

Abstract

Once again the Doha Round negotiators are struggling to reach an agreement, this time by mid-December on a “plan B” package that would give increased market access to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the form of duty-free-quota free (DFQF) access accompanied by simplified rules of origin. Estimating ‘effective market access' to the two largest ‘preference-givers', the US and EU preferences, this note shows that remaining market access left for the LDCs is negligible at around 3 percent in the EU but negative in the US (because textiles are excluded from the Generalized System of Preferences). An accompanying note assesses that the administrative costs that have to be borne to meet the origin requirements to obtain preferential status in OECD markets is likely to wipe out any remaining effective market access computed here, implying negligible market access to be obtained under “plan B”.

Keywords

  • Doha
  • Market access

Citation (ISO format)

CARRERE, Céline, DE MELO, Jaime. In Search of Market Access: Why the Doha “Plan B” for December 2011 is likely to fail Effective Market Access (Part I). 2011

Main files (1)

Report

Identifiers

  • PID : unige:46749
  • Report identifier : July 2011 B 24.1
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17/02/2015 16:11:00

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