Scientific article
Open access

TBTF : Do increased capital requirements, bail-in powers and resolution authority solve the problem?

ContributorsBahar, Rashid
Publication date2018

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, governments across the world decided that it was time to end the bail-out of too-big-to-fail financial institutions. This article considers the strategies deployed in Switzerland to solve the problem: increased capital requirements, including leverage ratios and liquidity requirements,funding of the resolution in the event of a gone-concern,resolution measures, through bail-in powers and the authority to transfer assets, liabilities and live agreements to another financial institution, as well as the resolution stay, and finally, organizational measures, which were not imposed through rules, but rather implemented through a carrot-and-stick approach using positive incentives and regulatory sanctions, to nudge financial institutions to improve their resolvability. In conclusion, we take stock by looking back at what was achieved, but also consider the risks that come with the increased powers granted to regulators and supervisory authorities following the crisis.

  • Banking supervision
  • Too Big to Fail
  • Systemically important financial institutions
  • Bail-in
  • Capital requirements
  • Bank resolution
Citation (ISO format)
BAHAR, Rashid. TBTF : Do increased capital requirements, bail-in powers and resolution authority solve the problem? In: Revue suisse de droit des affaires et du marché financier, 2018, n° 6, p. 619–638.
Main files (1)
Article (Published version)
  • PID : unige:147017
ISSN of the journal1018-7987

Technical informations

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