Book chapter
English

Emotional experience: affective consciousness and its role in emotion theory

Publisher

Oxford : Oxford University Press

Publication date

2020

Abstract

This chapter explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology, in order to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, it focuses on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria's nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such as sadness, fear, and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria's remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger's relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focusing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? This chapter argues that there are reasons to think it does.

Keywords

  • Emotional experience
  • Phenomenology
  • Emotion
  • Valence
  • Intentionality

UNIGE research groups

Citation (ISO format)

DEONNA, Julien, TERONI, Fabrice. Emotional experience: affective consciousness and its role in emotion theory. In: The Oxford handbook of the philosophy of consciousness. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2020. p. 102–121. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198749677.013.5

Main files (1)

Book chapter (Published version)

Identifiers

ISBN

978-0-19-874967-7
586views
12downloads

Technical informations

Creation

24/09/2020 10:53:00

First validation

24/09/2020 10:53:00

Update

08/01/2026 08:36:01

Status update

08/01/2026 08:36:01

Last indexation

31/08/2026 11:28:27
All rights reserved by Archive ouverte UNIGE and the University of Geneva
OpenAIRE Indexed & Validated