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Not quite neo-sentimentalism

Published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 2018, p. 1-23
Abstract The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions.
Keywords Neo-sentimentalismEmotionsConceptsRepresentationPhilosophy of Mind
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Research groups Thumos
Affective sciences
Project FNS: 100012_150265/1
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OLIVER-SKUSE, Tristram. Not quite neo-sentimentalism. In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2018, p. 1-23. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:102153

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Deposited on : 2018-02-14

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