Not quite neo-sentimentalism

Article Article scientifique Article Not quite neo-sentimentalism eng 2018 author Oliver-Skuse Tristram 862192 1-23 10.1080/00455091.2018.1429182 0045-5091 The view that some evaluative concepts are identical to some affective concepts naturally falls out of neo-sentimentalism, but it is unstable. This paper argues for a view of evaluative concepts that is neo-sentimentalist in spirit but which eschews the identity claim. If we adopt a Peacockean view of concepts, then we should think of some evaluative concepts as having possession conditions that are affective in some way. I argue that the best version of this thought claims that possessing those concepts requires being rationally compelled to form evaluative beliefs in response to certain emotions. Neo-sentimentalism Emotions Concepts Representation Philosophy of Mind Dewey 128.37 Swiss National Science Foundation Sensing as Activity: Its Impact on the Structure of Perceptual and Emotional Experience 150265 CH Project funding 15 Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives 0D8 false 1241 Affective sciences 961 Thumos Canadian Journal of Philosophy a3f8c13e-bf61-4766-9765-51b84424f3e9 Article (Published version) Restricted NotquiteneosentimentalismREDEPOT.pdf 1604893 application/pdf restrictedAccess Centres et instituts / Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives

Title	Published in	Access level	OA Policy	Year	Views	Downloads

Not quite neo-sentimentalism	Canadian Journal of Philosophy			2018	589	3

Archive ouverte UNIGE

Oliver-Skuse, Tristram