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Emotional Justification

Date de publication2017
Résumé

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view' of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem': If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties.

Mots-clés
  • Emotion
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Epistemology
  • Value Theory
  • Epistemic Justification
Citation (format ISO)
ECHEVERRI SALDARRIAGA, Santiago. Emotional Justification. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2017. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12453
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Article (Published version)
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Identifiants
ISSN du journal0031-8205
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Informations techniques

Création25/01/2018 10:48:00
Première validation25/01/2018 10:48:00
Heure de mise à jour15/03/2023 07:48:05
Changement de statut15/03/2023 07:48:05
Dernière indexation17/01/2024 02:08:49
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