Emotional Justification

Article Article scientifique Article Emotional Justification eng 2017 author Echeverri Saldarriaga Santiago 746673 10.1111/phpr.12453 0031-8205 Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view' of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem': If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties. Emotion Philosophy of Mind Epistemology Value Theory Epistemic Justification Dewey 128.37 15 Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives 0D8 false 1241 Affective sciences 961 Thumos Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23daa8db-8dd5-4673-8ed8-503ced6eb86c Article (Published version) Restricted Echeverri-2017-Philosophy_and_Phenomenological_Research.pdf 185670 application/pdf restrictedAccess Centres et instituts / Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives

Title	Published in	Access level	OA Policy	Year	Views	Downloads

Emotional Justification	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research			2017	945	5

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Echeverri Saldarriaga, Santiago