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Book chapter
English

The Epistemological Disunity of Memory

ContributorsTeroni, Fabriceorcid
Published inMind, Values, and Metaphysics, Editors Reboul, A., p. 557
PublisherSpringer
Publication date2014
Abstract

A long-­‐standing debate surrounds the question as to what justifies memory judgements. According to the Past Reason Theory, these judgements are justified by the reasons we had to make identical judgements in the past, whereas the Present Reason Theory claims that these justifying reasons are to be found at the time we pass the memory judgements. In this paper, I defend the original claim that, far from being exclusive, these two theories should be applied to different kinds of memory judgements. The Past Reason Theory offers the most appealing account of justified propositional memory judgements, while the Present Reason Theory provides the best approach to justified episodic memory judgements. One outcome of my discussion is thus that memory is not epistemologically unified and my argumenti n favour of this conclusion connects with the issues of internalism, reliabilism and the basing relation.

Keywords
  • Epistemology
  • Memory
  • Episodic and Semantic Memory
  • Philosophy of Mind
NoteVol. 2: Philosophical Essays in Honor of Kevin Mulligan
Citation (ISO format)
TERONI, Fabrice. The Epistemological Disunity of Memory. In: Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. [s.l.] : Springer, 2014. p. 557.
Main files (1)
Book chapter (Accepted version)
accessLevelRestricted
Identifiers
  • PID : unige:89439
ISBN9783319051451
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