Meinong's early essay, Zur erkenntnistheoretischen Würdigung des Gedächtnisses1, provides, despite its brevity, a very important discussion of mnesic phenomena. In this paper, I investigate some points I believe to be of particular interest: some of them are briefly broached by Meinong, whereas others form an important part of his argument. Moreover, I will connect the discussion with more recent concerns in analytical philosophy. This presentation is structured in the following way. In section (1), I present Meinong's definition of memory, and contrast it with more recent conceptions. In section (2), I present his epistemological discussion of memory judgements, which is further investigated in section (3), where I discuss the notion of presumptive evidence via the criticisms it elicited from Franz Brentano. At the end of this presentation, we will understand why Meinong's essay is a landmark in the philosophical investigation of memory.