en
Scientific article
English

Emotions and Formal Objects

ContributorsTeroni, Fabriceorcid
Published inDialectica, vol. 61, no. 3, no. Special Issue: Affective Intentionality and Practical Rationality, p. 395-415
Publication date2007
Abstract

It is often claimed that emotions are linked to formal objects. But what are formal objects? What roles do they play? According to some philosophers, formal objects are axiological properties which individuate emotions, make them intelligible and give their correctness conditions. In this paper, I evaluate these claims in order to answer the above questions. I first give reasons to doubt the thesis that formal objects individuate emotions. Second, I distinguish different ways in which emotions are intelligible and argue that philosophers are wrong in claiming that emotions only make sense when they are based on prior sources of axiological information. Third, I investigate how issues of intelligibility connect with the correctness conditions of emotions. I defend a theory according to which emotions do not respond to axiological information, but to nonaxiological reasons. According to this theory, we can allocate fundamental roles to the formal objects of emotions while dispensing with the problematic features of other theories.

Keywords
  • Emotion
  • Value
  • Intentionality
  • Affect/Emotion
  • Philosophy of Mind
Citation (ISO format)
TERONI, Fabrice. Emotions and Formal Objects. In: Dialectica, 2007, vol. 61, n° 3, p. 395–415. doi: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01108.x
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Identifiers
ISSN of the journal0012-2017
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