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Utilitarianism for the error theorist

Defense Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2016 - L. 844 - 2016/02/10
Abstract In the first part of the thesis, I defend the moral error theory: moral judgments are uniformly false because they state irreducibly normative facts while there are no such facts. Error theorists disagree as to what we should do with our moral beliefs: some think we should keep them; others insist that we get rid of them; still others invite us to replace them with different attitudes. All agree, however, that the issue depends on a cost-benefit analysis. On my view, which I expose in the second part of the thesis, it would be best for us to replace our moral beliefs with moral make-beliefs: we should accept a moral fiction. This raises the question: "What would be the content of this fiction?” In this respect, I argue that the moral fiction should be utilitarian: it should be composed of moral principles that would maximize overall well-being.
Keywords MetaethicsNormative metaethicsNormative ethicsError theoryCognitivismNon-descriptivismAnti-explanationismFictionalismMake-beliefUniversalismUtilitarianismJohn Harsanyi
URN: urn:nbn:ch:unige-807902
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Research group Affective sciences
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JAQUET, François. Utilitarianism for the error theorist. Université de Genève. Thèse, 2016. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:80790

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Deposited on : 2016-02-22

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