Scientific article
OA Policy
English

Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy

ContributorsLavenex, Sandraorcid
Published inJournal of European public policy, vol. 14, no. 5, p. 762-779
Publication date2007
Abstract

The introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in EU justice and home affairs co-operation has been associated with a ‘revolution' in internal security co-operation and has raised as many expectations as concerns. Whereas most discussions focus on the legal coherence of the concept in third pillar legislation and its potential tensions with procedural law and human rights standards, this article goes two steps back and questions at a more fundamental level the transferability of a principle of market integration into a core area of statehood and analyses the institutional preconditions for its implementation. Juxta- posing the different constellations of interdependence and governance modes in the economic and internal security spheres, it is argued that what functions as an instru- ment of liberalization in one sphere becomes a tool of governmentalization in the other, yet hampered by an unsettled tension between supranationality and states' prerogatives.

Keywords
  • Criminal law
  • Judicial co-operation
  • Justice and home affairs
  • Governance
  • Mutual recognition
  • Third pillar
Citation (ISO format)
LAVENEX, Sandra. Mutual recognition and the monopoly of force: limits of the single market analogy. In: Journal of European public policy, 2007, vol. 14, n° 5, p. 762–779. doi: 10.1080/13501760701428316
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Article (Published version)
accessLevelPublic
Identifiers
Journal ISSN1350-1763
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