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Book chapter
English

Strategic voting in a bicameral setting

Contributors

Hug, Simon

Published in

Thomas König, George Tsebelis, und Marc Debus (Ed.), Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies, p. 231-245

Publisher

Berlin : Springer

Publication date

2010

Abstract

Recent work on roll call votes has demonstrated the importance of considering more explicitly the agenda tree that leads to the votes considered. When doing so, the issue of whether members of parliament behave sincerely or in a sophisticated manner comes to the forefront. While a series of studies have, on the basis of examples mostly taken from the US Congress, tried to analyze with the help of theoretical models sophisticated voting, few studies have considered this type of voting in a bicameral setting. The present study proposes a game-theoretic model of sophisticated voting in a bicameral parliament. Assuming incomplete information on the preferences across the two chambers, the analysis demonstrates that in bicameral settings sophisticated voting cannot be considered chamber by chamber, but has to be analyzed in the context of the whole voting process.

Keywords

  • Parlement
  • Bicaméralisme
  • Vote stratégique

UNIGE affiliation entities

Citation (ISO format)

HUG, Simon. Strategic voting in a bicameral setting. In: Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies. Thomas König, George Tsebelis, und Marc Debus (Ed.). Berlin : Springer, 2010. p. 231–245. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_11

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Book chapter (Published version)

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Technical informations

Creation

21/03/2010 09:12:00

First validation

21/03/2010 09:12:00

Update

27/01/2026 08:03:13

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27/01/2026 08:03:13

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