UNIGE document Book Chapter
previous document  unige:6539  next document
add to browser collection
Title

Strategic voting in a bicameral setting

Author
Published in Thomas König, George Tsebelis, und Marc Debus. Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies. Berlin: Springer. 2010
Abstract Recent work on roll call votes has demonstrated the importance of considering more explicitly the agenda tree that leads to the votes considered. When doing so, the issue of whether members of parliament behave sincerely or in a sophisticated manner comes to the forefront. While a series of studies have, on the basis of examples mostly taken from the US Congress, tried to analyze with the help of theoretical models sophisticated voting, few studies have considered this type of voting in a bicameral setting. The present study proposes a game-theoretic model of sophisticated voting in a bicameral parliament. Assuming incomplete information on the preferences across the two chambers, the analysis demonstrates that in bicameral settings sophisticated voting cannot be considered chamber by chamber, but has to be analyzed in the context of the whole voting process.
Keywords ParlementBicaméralismeVote stratégique
Full text
Book chapter (199 Kb) - document accessible for UNIGE members only Limited access to UNIGE
Structures
Citation
(ISO format)
HUG, Simon. Strategic voting in a bicameral setting. In: Thomas König, George Tsebelis, und Marc Debus (Ed.). Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-Making in Modern Democracies. Berlin : Springer, 2010. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:6539

239 hits

2 downloads

Update

Deposited on : 2010-05-07

Export document
Format :
Citation style :