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The dissuasive Role of the Mean of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions

ContributorsCornu, Philippe
Collection
  • Cahiers de recherche; 1996.10
Publication date1996
Abstract

The preemptive role of the mean of payment in a takeover contest is analyzed following the bidders' point of view. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative means of payment and bidders' equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium requirements for a signaling game. Among other results, is found that high-type bidder ls offer cash whereas low-type bidder ls offer security as mean of payment, competition between bidders is more likely to occur after an initial security offer than after an initial cash offer, and bidder l's expected payoff is higher with an initial cash offer than with an initial security offer

Citation (ISO format)
CORNU, Philippe. The dissuasive Role of the Mean of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions. 1996
Identifiers
  • PID : unige:5950
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