• Home
  1. Home
  2. The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the U.K
Report
English

The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the U.K

Contributors

Cornu, Philippe; Isakov, Dusan

Collection

  • Cahiers de recherche; 1998.16

Publication date

1998

Abstract

The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analyzed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Eqilibrium requirements for a signaling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high-valuing bidder, strongly determinied to acquire the target firm Moreover, cash offers deter competition better than debt or equity offers. The theoretical results are validated with data from the U.K. over 1995-96

UNIGE affiliation entities

Citation (ISO format)

CORNU, Philippe, ISAKOV, Dusan. The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the U.K. 1998

Identifiers

  • PID : unige:5892
571views
0downloads

Technical informations

Creation

15/04/2010 12:21:03

First validation

15/04/2010 12:21:03

Update

14/03/2023 15:26:59

Status update

14/03/2023 15:26:59

Last indexation

29/10/2024 14:25:49
All rights reserved by Archive ouverte UNIGE and the University of Geneva
OpenAIRE Indexed & Validated