UNIGE document Report
previous document  unige:5892  next document
add to browser collection
Title

The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the U.K.

Authors
Year 1998
Collection Cahiers de recherche; 1998.16
Abstract The deterring role of the medium of payment in a takeover contest is analyzed from the point of view of the bidder. Cash, debt and equity are considered as alternative mediums of payment, and the bidder equilibrium strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Eqilibrium requirements for a signaling game. The model predicts notably that cash offers signal a high-valuing bidder, strongly determinied to acquire the target firm Moreover, cash offers deter competition better than debt or equity offers. The theoretical results are validated with data from the U.K. over 1995-96
Full text
This document has no fulltext available yet, but you can contact its author by using the form below.
Structures
Citation
(ISO format)
CORNU, Philippe, ISAKOV, Dusan. The Deterring Role of the Medium of Payment in Takeover Contests: Theory and Evidence from the U.K. 1998 https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:5892

175 hits

0 download

Update

Deposited on : 2010-04-15

Export document
Format :
Citation style :