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Optimal Bidding in Takeover Contests

ContributorsCornu, Philippe
Collection
  • Cahiers de recherche; 1998.17
Publication date1998
Abstract

The optimal bidding strategy for the inital bidder in takeover contests is investigated. In the model, the inital bidder has the choice between making a low or a high preemptive initial bid. Both type of bid can lead to a competitive auction process among bidders, and both information and bidding costs are included in the analysis. Optimal strategies are specified following the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The model predicts notably that the optimal strategy fo the initial bidder is to make a high preemtive initial bid. This strategy deters potential bidders to compete for the same target. The theoretical results are then examined with US data over the period 1990-1995. The level of bid premiums is notably found to be significantly related to the type of offer, i.e. hostile or friendly

Citation (ISO format)
CORNU, Philippe. Optimal Bidding in Takeover Contests. 1998
Identifiers
  • PID : unige:5891
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