Le patternalisme de Dennett
|Published in||Philosophiques. 1995, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 197-212|
|Abstract||This paper discusses Dennett's instrumentalist theory of intentionality, and his recent attempt to account for our realist intuitions about the mind by using the notion of "patterns" underlying our intentional ascriptions. But the notion is too weak and indeterminate to do the job that Dennett intends to confer to it. He systematically refrains from discussing the exact relationship between the intentional level and more physical levels. Davidson's notion of pattern is more realistic, but is still wanting, if our realistic intuitions are to be maintained.|
|Keywords||Functionalism — Intentionality — Metaphysics — Pattern — Dennett, Daniel|
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|ENGEL, Pascal. Le patternalisme de Dennett. In: Philosophiques, 1995, vol. 22, n° 2, p. 197-212. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:4895|