Scientific article
Open access

Believing, Holding True, and Accepting

ContributorsEngel, Pascal
Published inPhilosophical explorations, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 140-151
Publication date1998

Belief is not a unified phenomenon. In this paper I argue, as a number of other writers argue, that one should distinguish a variety of belief-like attitudes: believing proper-- a dispositional state which can have degrees -- holding true -- which can occur without understanding what one believes -- and accepting -- a practical and contextual attitude that has a role in deliberation and in practical reasoning. Acceptance itself is not a unified attitude. I explore the various relationships and differences between these doxastic attitudes, and claim that although acceptance is distinct from belief, it rests upon it, and is therefore a species of belief.

  • Acceptance
  • Belief
  • Epistemology
  • Pragmatism
  • Truth
Affiliation Not a UNIGE publication
Citation (ISO format)
ENGEL, Pascal. Believing, Holding True, and Accepting. In: Philosophical explorations, 1998, vol. 1, n° 2, p. 140–151. doi: 10.1080/10001998058538695
Main files (1)
Article (Accepted version)
ISSN of the journal1386-9795

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