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Scientific article
English

Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers

Published inJournal of the European Economic Association, vol. 5, no. 5, p. 1064-1093
Publication date2007
Citation (ISO format)
BALDWIN, Richard, ROBERT-NICOUD, Frédéric. Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers. In: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2007, vol. 5, n° 5, p. 1064–1093. doi: 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.5.1064
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accessLevelRestricted
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ISSN of the journal1542-4774
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