Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers
Contributors
Baldwin, Richard; Robert-Nicoud, FrédéricPublished in
Journal of the European Economic Association, vol. 5, no. 5, p. 1064-1093Publication date
2007UNIGE affiliation entities
Citation (ISO format)
BALDWIN, Richard, ROBERT-NICOUD, Frédéric. Entry and Asymmetric Lobbying: Why Governments Pick Losers. In: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2007, vol. 5, n° 5, p. 1064–1093. doi: 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.5.1064
Main files (1)
Article (Accepted version)
Identifiers
- PID : unige:40764
- DOI : 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.5.1064
