A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The eavesdropper (Eve) is supposed to have unlimited technological power while the honest parties (Alice and Bob) use present day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. They exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states for decreasing the information accessible to Eve in the multi-photon pulses accidentally produced by the imperfect source. An implementation of some of these protocols using present day technology allow for a secure key distribution up to distances of ∼ 150 km. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photon number splitting attacks.