Scientific article
Open access

In Defence of Swamping

ContributorsDutant, Julien
Published inThought, vol. 2, no. 4, p. 357-366
Publication date2013

The Swamping Problem shows that two claims are incompatible: (a) the claim that knowledge has more epistemic value than mere true belief and (b) a strict variant of the claim that all epistemic value is truth or instrumental on truth. Most current solutions reject (b). Carter and Jarvis (2012) and Carter, Jarvis and Rubin (2013) object instead to a principle that underlies the problem. This paper argues that their objections fail and the problem stands. It also outlines a novel solution which rejects (a). By carefully distinguishing value from expected value, one can argue that the greater value of knowledge is merely apparent (Dutant 2012; Petersen 2013).

  • Knowledge
  • Instrumental value
  • Expected value
  • Consequentialism
  • Meno's Thesis
Research group
Citation (ISO format)
DUTANT, Julien. In Defence of Swamping. In: Thought, 2013, vol. 2, n° 4, p. 357–366. doi: 10.1002/tht3.98
Main files (1)
Article (Accepted version)
ISSN of the journal2161-2234

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