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Strategic behavior in parliament

Bütikofer, Sarah
Published in The Journal of Legislative Studies. 2015, vol. 21, no. 3, p. 295-322
Abstract Most research on roll call votes considers each voting decision by members of parliaments (MPs) as an independent observation. Only recently have scholars (e.g., Clinton & Meirowitz 2004, Clinton 2012a) started to assess how knowledge about the sequence of votes may help us to understand the legislative process more in detail. Many of these analyses are, however, predicated on quite important assumptions regarding the forward-looking capacities of MPs. In this paper we draw on this more recent literature and bring it to bear in an analysis of two bills adopted in the Swiss parliament. Having available detailed information on the MPs’ preferences over various options voted on we are able to test whether MPs behave strategically, and to what degree they are capable of anticipating the way forward through the agenda tree. We find evidence that MPs behave strategically, however, their foresight is not as perfect as we would expect from theoretical models.
Keywords ParliamentVotingAgendaStrategySwiss politics
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Project FNS: 100012- 111909
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BÜTIKOFER, Sarah, HUG, Simon. Strategic behavior in parliament. In: The Journal of Legislative Studies, 2015, vol. 21, n° 3, p. 295-322. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:30303

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Deposited on : 2013-10-08

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