Scientific article
English

The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge

Contributors

Dutant, Julien

Published in

Dialogue - Canadian Philosophical Association, vol. 51, no. 01, p. 141-162

Publication date

2012

Abstract

Meno's Thesis—the idea that knowing something is better than merely having a true belief about it—is incompatible with the joint claims that (a) believing the truth is the sole source of the value of knowledge and (b) true belief and knowledge are equally successful in believing the truth. Recent answers to that so-called “swamping” problem reject either (a) or (b). This paper rejects Meno's Thesis instead, as relying on a confusion between expected value and value proper. The proposed solution relies on an externalist view of rationality, which is presented

Citation (ISO format)

DUTANT, Julien. The Value and Expected Value of Knowledge. In: Dialogue - Canadian Philosophical Association, 2012, vol. 51, n° 01, p. 141–162. doi: 10.1017/S0012217312000285

Main files (1)

Article (Published version)

Identifiers

Journal ISSN

0012-2173
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Technical informations

Creation

14/11/2012 12:46:00

First validation

14/11/2012 12:46:00

Update

14/03/2023 17:45:04

Status update

14/03/2023 17:45:03

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