This chapter examines how each side of the Washington-Taipei-Beijing strategic triangle has conceptualized deterrence, and the implications of those concepts for the stability of the Taiwan Strait. While there has been ongoing debate on the use of threats and assurances to achieve deterrence, this theoretical framework has been based on international relations theory, specifically the works of Thomas Schelling. To better understand the relationship between theory and policy, it is important to examine deterrence at an intermediate level of abstraction, centering on how states themselves have conceptualized deterrence, how those concepts have been implemented in strategy and policy, and how those concepts have diverged from the prescriptions of international relations theory. The United States has pursued a “defense-forward” concept of deterrence that prioritizes the military instruments of statecraft and limits the United States' ability to issue assurances. Taiwan has pursued a concept of deterrence that focuses on resilience and de-escalation. China has pursued a concept of deterrence that equates peace with coercion, conflating deterrence with compellence and undermining the credibility of its assurances.