This thesis examines the institutional design of international commercial courts (ICCs) and their development as hybrid adjudicatory bodies that blur the traditional line between public courts and private arbitration. By analyzing their jurisdiction, procedural rules, and operational features, the study shows how ICCs strategically combine elements of both systems to create a new model for transnational dispute resolution. The rise of ICCs reflects a mix of overlapping interests. For businesses, they offer a response to the perceived weaknesses of arbitration—such as lack of transparency and limited appeal—while preserving procedural flexibility. For states, ICCs serve economic and sometimes geopolitical goals. Law firms and legal professionals have also influenced their design, seeing them as an opportunity to expand legal markets. However, this hybrid nature brings both potential and complexity. The thesis identifies three main concerns. First, the often-used regulatory competition framework does not fully explain the varied motivations behind ICCs or the distinct legal markets they aim to serve. Second, while some worry that ICCs weaken courts’ public role, many of these courts contribute to legal development through published judgments. Third, their institutional design often reflects neoliberal values, raising questions about equity and the role of courts in society. As ICCs continue to grow, their success will depend on finding a balance between commercial efficiency and public accountability—offering not just a new forum for business disputes, but a more inclusive model of international adjudication.