The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively

Dietrich, Simone

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011

Scientific article

English

The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively

ContributorsDietrich, Simone

Published inWorld development, vol. 39, no. 1, p. 55-63

Publication date2011-01

Affiliation entities

Faculté des sciences de la société / Département de science politique et relations internationales

Citation (ISO format)

DIETRICH, Simone. The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively. In: World development, 2011, vol. 39, n° 1, p. 55–63. doi: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011

Article (Published version)

Identifiers

PID : unige:183939
DOI : 10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.06.011

Additional URL for this publicationhttps://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0305750X10001166

Journal ISSN0305-750X

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The Politics of Public Health Aid: Why Corrupt Governments Have Incentives to Implement Aid Effectively

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