The thesis investigates electoral systems in deeply divided societies with power-sharing arrangements, focusing on the impact of cross-ethnic voting rules in consociational democracies marked by imbalance of power between two dominant ethnic groups. The research consists of four articles, one co-authored and three single-authored. The first article discusses centripetal elements that can be used to alter the consociational system, proposing an innovative cross-ethnic voting mechanism based on the geometric mean model to preserve consociational features such as protection of the dominant minority. The second proposes centripetal alternatives such as territorial distribution requirements for election of majority/minority representatives, discussing nuances and the conditions needed to encourage acceptance of applying such elements to improve power-sharing. The third introduces a new electoral model based on mathematical and geographic conditions (the “communal college”), employing a weighted electoral formula based on the demographic census and on regional boundaries to define electoral constituencies. The fourth observes differences in accessing the four basic consociational elements (grand coalition, autonomy, mutual veto, proportionality) affecting dominant minorities and majorities. Asymmetries from systems enabling or preventing groups enjoying one or more of the four principles lead to what we define “asymmetrical consociations”, creating preconditions for centrifugal dynamics and inter-segmental obstructions. Overall, the research argues that centripetal electoral systems without consociational features may fail to ensure stability, especially in dyadic societies with dominant minority groups. Applying centripetal cross-ethnic voting incentives that contain consociational requirements could make electoral systems more appealing to dominant minority segments, reducing grievances and enhancing the survival chances of non-majoritarian dual societies and federations. The study also suggests that weak centripetal mechanisms may be acceptable for minority groups under certain conditions, such as electoral systems allowing minority veto powers and preventing strategic voting exercised by elites representing the interest of dominant majority groups. The adoption of electoral systems in dyadic societies is also influenced by the demands of majority group elites to maintain cross-ethnic voting rules. On the whole, the dissertation enhances the debate on electoral system design for power-sharing democracies and contributes to recent debates between consociationalism and centripetalism.