Since 1954, the ICJ has introduced in its jurisprudence the “Monetary Gold” principle. According to this principle, the Court cannot exercise a jurisdiction regularly conferred if it must, in order to decide the dispute having been submitted to it, first decide on the legal position of a third state that has not given its consent to the Court doing so. In an interconnected word where the jurisdiction of the Court is already frustrated by the rarity of required consent or by many reservations engrafted upon the various titles of jurisdiction, it has proven necessary in practice the reduce the potentially toxic scope of a “Monetary Gold” principle writ too large. This contribution considers the stages through which the Court progressively tamed the principle, either by tuning down its reach through well-calibrated carve-outs (e.g., the Nauru jurisprudence) or by affirming that consent had been somehow in effect conferred (the recent Guyana/Venezuela jurisprudence). The true and current scope of the principle is thereby reassessed.