In the empirical literature, the question whether fiscal austerity is unpopular or not is much discussed. One line of research shows that consolidation has negative effects, ranging from declines in approval ratings to vote abstention. Another demonstrates that, in fact, re-election chances are not harmed by governments implementing austerity. Both sides are limited in at least two regards. First, they do not allow for the possibility that public opinion is heavily cued about the necessity to reduce government debts and budget deficits. Second, the literature is limited in its extent to which it considers heterogeneity across income groups. I argue that addressing these two limitations sheds new light on this empirical dispute. I find that high-income voters are more prone to respond to their party’s austerity cues demanding a smaller government budget. I match cross-country over time individual level survey data on fiscal preferences with data on party manifesto’s attention to austerity for 60 country-years. I conclude by suggesting that as high-incomes are more likely to turn out at elections, they are less prone to punish governments. But because low-income voters are less adjusted, they punish mainstream parties by turning to other parties or abstain from voting.