Investment Arbitration : Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study

Schultz, Thomas; Dupont, Cédric

doi:10.1093/ejil/chu075

Scientific article

English

Investment Arbitration : Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study

ContributorsSchultz, Thomas

; Dupont, Cédric

Published inEuropean journal of international law, vol. 25, no. 4, p. 1147-1168

Publication date2014-11

First online date2015-01-20

Affiliation entities

Faculté de droit / Département de droit international privé

Citation (ISO format)

SCHULTZ, Thomas, DUPONT, Cédric. Investment Arbitration : Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study. In: European journal of international law, 2014, vol. 25, n° 4, p. 1147–1168. doi: 10.1093/ejil/chu075

Article (Published version)

Identifiers

PID : unige:167983
DOI : 10.1093/ejil/chu075

Journal ISSN0938-5428

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Investment Arbitration : Promoting the Rule of Law or Over-empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study

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