This paper aims to identify the most important challenges preventing the production of actionable military intelligence to the peacekeeping commanders. Researching beyond the usual mediatized suspects such as the "lack of assets", it argues that peacekeeping missions, their troops contributing countries and their sections and sub-units behave in conformity with the rational choice institutionalism theory (RCI), both in maximizing their own preference such as preserving their individual secrecy, as well as in negligence and policy shifting. In practice, it notably translates into distrust among partners which are expected to cooperate. When conducting a case study of three different UN missions (MONUSCO, UNMISS and MINUSMA) to test the thesis main arguments, the present work furthermore provides evidence that institutional and personal integration constitutes a decisive mitigating factor to the adverse behaviors such as the lack the trust, expected by RCI theory. Integration, the paper concludes, plays a key role in the successful production of actionable intelligence in cooperative environments such as the peacekeeping missions as it mitigates the lack of trust among partners.