« Mentalism without Psychologism. Abelard's Dicta as Mental, Objective Entities », in L. Cesalli, P. Emamzadah, F. Goubier, M. Roques (eds.), Ontological Comittment in Medieval Logic (= Medioevo 44) 2020, 17-37. In this paper, I consider an option that, as far as I can tell, is almost a newcomer on the stage2 and, to some extent at least, a quite iconoclastic one. The hypothesis is that dicta are mental, yet objective entities. That view has its roots in the simple intuition that the technical term ‘dictum' has to be taken at face value, namely as referring to an item, whatever it is,3 that depends on a proposition. Furthermore, I will argue that such a dependence does not prevent dicta from possessing the objectivity Abelard wants them to have. The way to conciliate mental dependence with objectivity will be explained on the basis of a (quasi) contemporary account of states of affairs as mental, objective entities. In terms of ontological commitment, then, the claim is that Abelard's propositional semantics commits him to special mental, objective entities that are precisely what propositions say.The paper is divided into three main sections. §1 briefly introduces the Abelardian notion of “what propositions say” (dicta propositionum) and formulate two series of characteristic claims (functional and ontological ones) about dicta; §2 argues for the case of dicta being dependent on mental acts and, more precisely, on what Abelard calls the modus enuntiandi (the mode of stating); §3 is an attempt to assess dicta as products of mental acts; §4, drawing on Carl Stumpf's notion of formation (Gebilde), explains how dicta can be at the same time dependent of mental acts and objective entities.