Book chapter
English

Valence, bodily (dis)pleasure, and emotion

ContributorsTeroni, Fabriceorcid
Published inBain, D., Brady, M. and Corns, J. (Ed.), Philosophy of suffering: metaphysics, value, and normativity, p. 103-122
PublisherNew York : Routledge
Publication date2019
Abstract

Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-à-vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions contain bodily (dis)pleasures. I argue that bodily (dis)pleasures are intentional states whose valence is to be understood in terms of evaluative experience, and bring to light the similarities and dissimilarities between their intentional structure and that of emotions. On this backdrop, I offer reasons to conclude that we should adopt neither of the two theses.

Keywords
  • Emotion
  • Object and content of emotion
  • Pain
  • Suffering
Citation (ISO format)
TERONI, Fabrice. Valence, bodily (dis)pleasure, and emotion. In: Philosophy of suffering: metaphysics, value, and normativity. Bain, D., Brady, M. and Corns, J. (Ed.). New York : Routledge, 2019. p. 103–122.
Main files (1)
Book chapter (Accepted version)
accessLevelRestricted
Identifiers
  • PID : unige:144234
ISBN9780815361787
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5downloads

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