Ethics plays a crucial role in international adjudication, in particular in the context of international criminal proceedings where the liberty of the accused is at stake. Criminal courts have been trying to create an “international judicial culture” based on shared ethical standards. In doing so, however, they are constantly faced with an obstacle inherent in the very idea of ethics: the impossibility of defining what constitutes “ethical conduct” divorced from one's culture, tradition, legal system, or professional background. This contribution intends to explore the complexity of trying to define the contours of ethical standards in international criminal proceedings, in particular in the absence of precise written rules, by focusing on the Furundžija case. Even when rules are codified, however, they often remain open to divergent interpretations depending on one's cultural, social, and legal background. Ultimately, it is not simply a matter of codifying ethical rules but, more importantly, of agreeing on “whose ethics” these rules should reflect.