en
Scientific article
English

In the shadow of sunshine regulation: Explaining disclosure biases

Published inRegulation and Governance, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 200-225
Publication date2021
Abstract

Performance reporting in sunshine regulation is subjected to disclosure biases, because agents may game the regulation or encounter difficulties in complying. These biases limit the appraisal of the impact of sunshine regulation on performance. We investigate the behavioral causes of such disclosure biases by focusing on transaction cost economizing and opportunism. We provide an original methodology to take into account information asymmetries in principal–agent relationships. We focus on water utilities management in France. Our data set includes 795 observations covering water utilities and performance indicators characteristics. It allows for comparisons of revealed and observed performances and identifies different types of disclosure biases. Findings indicate that opportunism is a significant motivation for disclosure biases, while, unexpectedly, transaction costs are not a direct trigger of disclosure biases.

Keywords
  • Disclosure
  • Organization
  • Performance management
  • Public management
  • Regulation
Funding
  • Swiss National Science Foundation - InfraGouv: Economie Politique de la gestion des infrastructures d'eau
Citation (ISO format)
BOLOGNESI, Thomas, PFLIEGER, Géraldine. In the shadow of sunshine regulation: Explaining disclosure biases. In: Regulation and Governance, 2021, vol. 15, n° 1, p. 200–225. doi: 10.1111/rego.12286
Main files (1)
Article (Published version)
accessLevelRestricted
Identifiers
ISSN of the journal1748-5983
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Technical informations

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