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No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist?

Published in Philosophical Papers. 2015, vol. 44, no. 2, p. 207-232
Abstract The dispositional monist believes that all properties are essentially causal. Recently, an overdetermination argument has been proposed by Trenton Merricks to support nihilism about ordinary objects. I argue that this argument can be extended to target both nihilism about ordinary objects and nihilism about physical particles when dispositional monism is assumed. It implies that a philosopher who both endorses dispositional monism and takes seriously the overdetermination argument should not believe in the existence of physical particles. I end up by discussing possible objections. I suggest, then, that if we live in a world that is inhabited by causal properties but not by chairs and tables, then we also live in a world without electrons and quarks, a world of dispositional properties, that is, a world of causal fields.
Keywords DispositionsPhysical particlesNihilismEliminativismOverdetermination
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Research groups Geneva Centre for Philosophy of Science
Geneva Symmetry Group
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LE BIHAN, Baptiste. No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist?. In: Philosophical Papers, 2015, vol. 44, n° 2, p. 207-232. doi: 10.1080/05568641.2015.1056960 https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:120268

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Deposited on : 2019-07-02

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