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No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

Published in Axiomathes. 2014, vol. 24, no. 4, p. 483-497
Abstract According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?
Keywords Growing BlockSkepticismMetaphysical ContingentismGödelOntologyTemporal ExistenceNo-futurism
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Research groups Geneva Symmetry Group
Geneva Centre for Philosophy of Science
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LE BIHAN, Baptiste. No-Futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism. In: Axiomathes, 2014, vol. 24, n° 4, p. 483-497. doi: 10.1007/s10516-014-9236-9 https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:116287

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Deposited on : 2019-04-15

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