en
Scientific article
Open access
English

Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma

Published inThe European Physical Journal. B, Condensed Matter, vol. 71, no. 4, p. 579-585
Collection
  • Open Access - Licence nationale Springer 
Publication date2009
Abstract

We study a spatial Prisoner's dilemma game with two types (A and B) of players located on a square lattice. Players following either cooperator or defector strategies play Prisoner's Dilemma games with their 24 nearest neighbors. The players are allowed to adopt one of their neighbor's strategy with a probability dependent on the payoff difference and type of the given neighbor. Players A and B have different efficiency in the transfer of their own strategies; therefore the strategy adoption probability is reduced by a multiplicative factor (w < 1) from the players of type B. We report that the motion of the influential payers (type A) can improve remarkably the maintenance of cooperation even for their low densities.

Citation (ISO format)
DROZ, Michel, SZWABIŃSKI, J., SZABÓ, G. Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: The European Physical Journal. B, Condensed Matter, 2009, vol. 71, n° 4, p. 579–585. doi: 10.1140/epjb/e2009-00160-1
Main files (1)
Article (Published version)
accessLevelPublic
Identifiers
ISSN of the journal1434-6028
278views
169downloads

Technical informations

Creation04/02/2019 2:06:00 PM
First validation04/02/2019 2:06:00 PM
Update time03/15/2023 4:07:46 PM
Status update03/15/2023 4:07:46 PM
Last indexation01/17/2024 5:18:35 AM
All rights reserved by Archive ouverte UNIGE and the University of GenevaunigeBlack