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Title

Two Kinds of Moral Competence: Moral Agent, Moral Judge

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Published in Musschenga, B. & van Harskamp, A. What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands. 2013, p. 117-130
Abstract In this paper, I argue that some of the disagreements about the continuity or discontinuity of human moral life with that of animals can be assuaged by drawing a distinction between two senses in which someone can be a ‘moral being’: being a moral agent (i.e. being morally responsible for one’s action) and being a moral judge (i.e. being able to form moral judgments). More precisely, I argue that it is not necessary to be a moral judge to be a moral agent, because moral actions (actions we are morally responsible for) don’t need to stem from moral judgments. Consequently, I argue that, even if moral judgment is highly likely to be a human specificity, moral agency is something that we might share with other animals, given that the only requisite to be a moral agent is to be able to be motivated by the fact that other entities do have interests.
Keywords Moral JudgmentMoral ResponsibilityMoral Agent
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ISBN: 978-94-007-6342-5
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Structures
Research groups Thumos
Affective sciences
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(ISO format)
COVA, Florian. Two Kinds of Moral Competence: Moral Agent, Moral Judge. In: Musschenga, B. & van Harskamp, A. (Ed.). What Makes Us Moral? On the capacities and conditions for being moral. Dordrecht : Springer Netherlands, 2013. p. 117-130. https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:109903

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Deposited on : 2018-10-26

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