Scientific article

Power-sharing: Institutions, behavior, and peace

Published inAmerican Journal of Political Science, vol. 63, no. 1, p. 84-100
Publication date2019

Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment discrimination of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale violence. We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.

  • Partage de pouvoir
  • Conflits
  • Guerre civile
  • Fédéralisme
Citation (ISO format)
BORMANN, Nils-Christian et al. Power-sharing: Institutions, behavior, and peace. In: American Journal of Political Science, 2019, vol. 63, n° 1, p. 84–100.
Main files (1)
Article (Submitted version)
  • PID : unige:102667
ISSN of the journal0092-5853

Technical informations

Creation03/04/2018 1:50:00 PM
First validation03/04/2018 1:50:00 PM
Update time03/15/2023 7:55:53 AM
Status update03/15/2023 7:55:53 AM
Last indexation01/17/2024 2:23:36 AM
All rights reserved by Archive ouverte UNIGE and the University of GenevaunigeBlack