Believing without modes of presentation

Diplôme Thèse Believing without modes of presentation eng 2012-10-24 author Bonardi Paolo 562428 director Mulligan Kevin 22751 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:34013 urn:nbn:ch:unige-340130 L. 761 In my dissertation I devise a number of new puzzles about belief reports which, unlike Frege's and Kripke's classical puzzles, cannot be solved by appealing to the notion of a mode of presentation. A solution to both classical and new puzzles can be achieved by adopting a new Russellian account of belief reports, which I present in this dissertation. The new account involves two psychological devices (which will be proved not to be modes of presentation): belief subsystems and cognitive coordination. The former device originates in Donald Davidson's idea of explaining away cases of apparent irrationality of a subject by partitioning her mind into semi-autonomous compartments or subsystems. The latter device takes its cue from Kit Fine's notion of coordination and deals with the ability (or inability) of a subject to recognize two occurrences of an object within Russellian propositions as occurrences of the same object. Belief Belief reports Modes of presentation Russellianism Coordination Belief subsystems Dewey 100/501 89 Département de philosophie 3G false 2436c1df-16b0-438d-9466-29fe0707b446 Thesis Public bonardi.pdf 1299033 application/pdf Restricted 2015-06-20 7b1b38bbbcd9d856dff31204f8b74a235feea2da09893669791d0d6991ab5862 openAccess Faculté des lettres / Département de philosophie

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Believing without modes of presentation				2012	911	377

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Bonardi, Paolo