The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure

Article Article scientifique Article The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure eng 2026-02-20 2026-06 author Broi Antonin 0000-0002-9350-5942 Université de Genève 440841 Services communs du CISA (EMCO) 119-128 10.1017/s0953820826100247 0953-8208 https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0953820826100247/type/journal_article <p>Pleasure is widely thought to have intrinsic value. However, this thesis has been threatened by the argument that pleasure is a mental state that essentially involves the subject’s conative attitudes. Its value, then, would be subjective. Though the existing version of the argument can be resisted by simply rejecting the attitudinal theories of pleasure on which it is based, I will develop a new and more general version based on the reasonable hypothesis that the phenomenal character of pleasure is reducible to a physical or functional property. If this new version is convincing, then the most promising way to secure the intrinsicality of the value of pleasure and to escape all versions of the subjectivity argument might be to embrace a non-reductionist account of pleasure and its value.</p> Dewey 128.37 15 Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives 0D8 false 1241 Affective sciences Utilitas 38 2 8d7f1159-67f1-4a58-829d-bb9ff35668f9 Article (Published version) Public Article_scientifique_from_crossref.pdf 210712 application/pdf CC BY-4.0 510beae90ed3912dff24770651a66d0c239729a08ada23371cb30bd73771ff1c openAccess Centres et instituts / Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives

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The Subjectivity Argument against the Intrinsic Value of Pleasure	Utilitas			2026	12	74

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Broi, Antonin