Shame, Guilt and Morality

Article Article scientifique Article Shame, Guilt and Morality eng 2011 author Teroni Fabrice 0000-0001-6532-4258 89389 author Bruun Otto 108125 223-245 10.1163/174552411X563574 1740-4681 http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/174552411x563574 The connection between shame, guilt and morality is the topic of many recent debates. A broad tendency consists in attributing a higher moral status and a greater moral relevance to guilt, a claim motivated by arguments that tap into various areas of morality and moral psychology. The Pro-social Argument has it that guilt is, contrary to shame, morally good since it promotes pro-social behaviour. Three other arguments claim that only guilt has the requisite connection to central moral concepts: the Responsibility Argument appeals to the ties between guilt and responsibility, the Autonomy Argument to the heteronomy of shame and the Social Argument to shame's link with reputation. In this paper, we scrutinize these arguments and argue that they cannot support the conclusion that they try to establish. We conclude that a narrow focus on particular criteria and a misconception of shame and guilt have obscured the important roles shame plays in our moral lives Emotion Shame Moral emotion Guilt/Shame (psychology) Philosophy of Mind Dewey 100/501 Dewey 128.37 15 Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives 0D8 89 Département de philosophie 3G false 1241 Affective sciences 961 Thumos Journal of moral philosophy 8 2 f6699199-9c4d-44de-bfe3-65029e792b0a Article (Accepted version) Restricted Shame_Guilt_and_Morality.pdf 214289 application/pdf restrictedAccess Centres et instituts / Centre interfacultaire en sciences affectives Faculté des lettres / Département de philosophie

Title	Published in	Access level	OA Policy	Year	Views	Downloads

Shame, Guilt and Morality	Journal of moral philosophy			2011	894	16

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Bruun, Otto