Scientific article
OA Policy
English

Democratic epistemology and democratic morality: the appeal and challenges of peircean pragmatism

Publication date2019-07-06
First online date2017-07-27
Abstract

Does the wide distribution of political power in democracies, relative to other modes of government, result in better decisions? Specifically, do we have any reason to believe that they are better qualitatively – more reasoned, better supported by the available evidence, more deserving of support – than those which have been made by other means? In order to answer this question we examine the recent effort by Talisse and Misak to show that democracy is epistemically justified. Highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of their arguments, we conclude that the differences between an epistemic conception of democracy and an epistemic justification of democracy are fundamental to determining the relative attractions of different arguments for democracy, and their implications for actual forms of government.

Keywords
  • Epistemic Democracy
  • Pragmatism
  • Peirce
  • Dewey
  • Epistemic justification
Citation (ISO format)
LEVER, Annabelle, CHIN, Clayton. Democratic epistemology and democratic morality: the appeal and challenges of peircean pragmatism. In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy, 2019, vol. 22, n° 4, p. 432–453. doi: 10.1080/13698230.2017.1357411
Main files (1)
Article (Accepted version)
accessLevelPublic
Identifiers
Journal ISSN1369-8230
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330downloads

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