Professional article
OA Policy
English

Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector

Published in

Journal of banking & finance, vol. 37, no. 4, p. 1119-1306

Publication date

2013

Abstract

We investigate the effects of margining, a widely-used mechanism for attaching collateral to derivatives contracts, on derivatives trading volume, default risk, and on the welfare in the banking sector. First, we develop a stylized banking sector equilibrium model to develop some basic intuition of the effects of margining. We find that a margin requirement can be privately and socially sub-optimal. Subsequently, we extend this model into a dynamic simulation model that captures some of the essential characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets. Contrarily to the common belief that margining always reduces default risk, we find that there exist situations in which margining increases default risk, reduces aggregate derivatives' trading volume, and has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the banking sector. The negative effects of margining are exacerbated during periods of market stress when margin rates are high and collateral is scarce. We also find that central counterparties only lift some of the inefficiencies caused by margining.

Keywords

  • Derivative securities
  • Default risk
  • Collateral
  • Margining
  • Systemic risk

Citation (ISO format)

GIBSON BRANDON, Rajna Nicole, MURAWSKI, Carsten. Margining in derivatives markets and the stability of the banking sector. In: Journal of banking & finance, 2013, vol. 37, n° 4, p. 1119–1306. doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.10.005

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Article (Published version)

Identifiers

Journal ISSN

0378-4266
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Technical informations

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