Proportionality in electoral systems is often seen as the best means to produce statistically

representative government. In this paper, I argue that majority bonuses—whereby the party

that obtains a plurality of votes automatically obtains an absolute majority in the legislature—

can bolster the number of statistically atypical working-class candidates that manage to obtain

office in PR systems. The difference is mechanically driven, as workers are systematically

granted lower placements on party lists. Majority bonuses reduce the number of parties in the

legislature, by increasing the number of seats allocated to winning parties. Formula disproportionality

thus allows a larger number of workers with low list placements to enter politics. As

a test of theory, I present evidence from a natural experiment on a municipality-level change

in electoral formulas, which took place in Italy in 1993. Leveraging a difference-in-discontinuities

design, I find that the bonus improves working class representation in municipal councils.

Effects are driven by a positive change in the proportion of workers that enter councils via winning

party lists.