This chapter shows that the actions undertaken by export credit agencies (ECAs) and export-import banks (EIBs) have encouraged moral hazard and induced risk-taking behaviors. Section 1 investigates how and why the legal and regulatory frameworks of ECAs and EIBs have contributed to reinforcing moral hazard. In fact, moral hazard results from a combination of the fierce international competition and the information asymmetry between insurers/lenders, exporters, and importers. Section 2 explores the practices of the U.S. Exim Bank in the 1970s. In a context of massive lending to developing countries, this institution refrained from using a reliable country risk rating system and prioritized the foreign borrowers most capable of obtaining preferential treatment from their government. It is not surprising that the percentage of non-performing loans soared during 1975-1982 and undermined the credibility of the U.S. Exim Bank.