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The Limits of Governance: How Far Does Policy Analysis Travel in International Relations?

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ABSTRACT

This article retraces the mutual rapprochement between Policy Analysis and International Relations and addresses its limits. Looking beyond the circle of advanced liberal-democratic economies, three limits are discussed: the need to specify the prerequisites of different modes of governance; to consider the relations of power and domination in these processes; and to look beyond regulatory issues at the political and societal conflicts surrounding policy diffusion.

KEYWORDS

Governance; international relations; policy analysis

Introduction

To say that the study of domestic politics and International Relations (IR) has increasingly converged has become commonplace. The internationalization of domestic affairs goes hand in hand with the progressing institutionalization of international politics. These developments have been mirrored in political science. Subdisciplines that were originally designed to analyze policy-making at the domestic level, such as policy analysis (PA), have enlarged their analytical scope to cross-national processes of policy coordination and decision-making beyond the state. Guided by her intellectual curiosity and the spirit to constantly move toward new horizons, Adrienne Héritier has pioneered this transgression of “methodological nationalism”, detecting subtle connections between hitherto separate research fields (see Heidbreder, 2017; Jensen & Tatham, 2017; this volume).

As succinctly put in her groundbreaking 1987 book on PA, “Public Policy as an object of official action is an endless field…. Even with the greatest imagination one cannot detect ‘natural’ boundaries” (Windhoff-Héritier, 1987, p. 7). And indeed, Adrienne Héritier’s migration from German “Implementationsforschung” (Héritier, 1980) to Europeanization (Héritier, 1994, 2001), European integration (Héritier & Rhodes, 2010; Héritier, 1999, 2007), and global public goods (Héritier et al., 2002) is in itself a document of PA’s visionary travels through the subdisciplines of political science.

The internationalization of PA has been echoed by the “domestication” of IR scholarship. This is especially the case for the liberal paradigm within IR, which has historically been interested in the domestic foundations of international politics. To mention just a few examples, in 1996, Thomas Risse made IR and Comparative PA “meet the EU beast” (Risse, 1996). Two years later, Helen Milner observed a “synthesis of international, American and comparative politics” (Milner, 1998), and in 2014 Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman proposed taking “domestic institutions beyond the nation-state” in chartering a new inter-dependence approach (Farrell & Newman, 2014).

The epitome of this scholarly convergence is the notion of “governance” understood as an institutionalized form of collectively binding decision-making that eludes traditional distinctions between domestic political order and international anarchy (Rosenau, 1992). The understanding that the modes and structures of policy-making have seen strong diversification and that they often transcend national boundaries has inspired countless scholars and PhD students. Roughly three decades after its emergence, the notion of governance has become commonplace in both PA and IR. Yet how far does “governance” travel in IR, where does this concept reach its limits and starts diluting?

Taking up Adrienne Héritier’s encouragement to transgress the boundaries of PA (ob cit.), this article takes stock of the rapprochement between PA and IR through the concept of governance and sets out to

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1Translated from the original in German: “Public Policy als Gegenstand öffentlichen Handelns ist ein unendlich weites Feld…. Auch mit dem grössten Aufgebot an Phantasie sind hier keine “natürlichen” Grenzen zu entdecken” (ibid.)
explore its limits in terms of the type of policies, politics, and polities it emphasizes.

We start with a brief recapitulation of the rapprochement between PA and IR before addressing three limits of the state of the art: the need to specify the prerequisites of governance; the ubiquity of power relations in governance; and the conflicts surrounding the diffusion and the democratic legitimacy of the regulatory bias that underpins the majority of governance approaches.

**The rapprochement**

Public PA investigates the origins, the design, the implementation, and the consequences of political rules across policy areas and across policy-making levels. IR deals with the relations between states and their constituencies across national boundaries. The “de-bordering” of the two subdisciplines occurred within the historical context of 1990s–2000s—“the high-water mark” of liberal internationalism (Crocker, 2015). This period following the end of the Cold War was characterized by a particular optimism regarding the scope for international cooperation in the solution of transboundary problems. At the national level, this period coincided with the transition from the interventionist state to what has been coined the “regulatory state”, a technocratic understanding of politics that operates at arms’ length from government (Majone, 1994; Levi-Faur, 2013). In the following, we argue that together with this particular historical context, the rapprochement between PA and IR has tended to develop a particular notion of governance that needs to be recontextualized today. In short, this particular understanding of governance can be identified at three levels: the properties of the institutions studied (polity); the processes of political interaction (politics); and the product of these interactions (policies).

**Institutional polyarchy**

At the origin, the two subdisciplines had opposite understandings of the institutional structure of social interaction in their respective realms, PA in the domestic context of nation states and IR outside of it. As succinctly put by Kenneth Waltz:

> The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super- and subordination. Some are entitled to command; others are required to obey. Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic. The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic. (Waltz, 1979, p. 88)

This neat dichotomy has been challenged early on, however, by both camps. After some dissatisfaction with the “Planungseuphorie” of the 1960s in Germany, scholars such as Renate Mayntz, Fritz Scharpf, Adrienne Héritier, and others have developed the notion of the “cooperative state” (Mayntz, 1987) in which horizontal forms of coordination and negotiation complement traditional notions of hierarchical steering. Indeed, according to Scharpf, by the 1990s, political science was rather dealing with the erosion of states’ capacity to steer domestic politics hierarchically. The challenge was hence to theories and conceptualize the “real existing amount” (Scharpf, 1993, p. 57) of coordination within and between states rather than to continue emphasizing the demise of hierarchical steering.

In parallel, IR scholars began to increasingly contest Waltz’s neorealist dichotomy of domestic order versus international anarchy. To some extent, Keohane’s investigations (together with Robert Axelrod) of “cooperation under anarchy” (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985), and “after hegemony” (Keohane, 1984), address similar questions as those posed by Scharpf and colleagues, looking at horizontal coordination not within but between states. While these concrete contributions left the premise of international anarchy unaffected, earlier work by Keohane and Nye had already highlighted how ties linking (sub-) governmental (transgovernmental) and societal (transnational) actors influenced domestic and international rules (Keohane & Nye, 1974, 1977).

The resulting institutional order shaping both subdisciplines thus “varies along a continuum from hierarchy to anarchy, with most politics resembling polyarchy, which lies in between these extremes” (Milner, 1998, p. 774). The meeting point where IR and PA scholars converge is the ubiquitous notion of “governance” focusing on less hierarchical and more horizontal forms of public and private regulation and coordination.

The rise of “governance” is best understood in the context of the multiple shifts in modes of political

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2This to say that there are important subfields within PA and IR that remain unconnected, for instance IR scholarship that is not interested in international cooperation.

3Politikwissenschaft beschreibt eher die Erosion der hierarchischen Koordinationskapazität nationalstaatlicher…Politik” (Scharpf, 1993, p. 57).

4Here, this term is used not in Robert Dahl’s sense, where it refers to different degrees of democracy existing in a country (Dahl, 1989).
coordination over the last decades beyond hierarchies and markets:

These shifts suggest that authority is institutionalized, or at least can be institutionalized in different spheres, and by implication these arenas can compete, bargain, or coordinate among themselves or ignore each other. The shifts are conceptualized in three different directions: upward (to the regional, transnational, intergovernmental, and global), downward (to the local, regional, and the metropolitan), and horizontally (to private and civil spheres of authority). (Levi-Faur, 2012, p. 7)

The distinctive feature of this new architecture of how political authority is devolved is the phenomenon of networks and interlinkages between actors. With these horizontal forms of societal coordination come an increasing interest in more informal institutions. So-called “new modes of governance” have been hailed to capture non-hierarchical, more voluntary, and sometimes informal systems of rules (Héritier & Rhodes, 2010; Héritier, 2002). In IR, scholars have become interested in phenomena dubbed “soft law” (Abbott & Snidal, 2000), transnational regulations among private actors (i.a. Cutler, Hauller, & Porter, 1999), or interexecutive, transgovernmental coordination (i.a. Bach & Newman, 2007; Farrell & Newman, 2014; Raustiala, 2002; Slaughter, 2004).\(^5\) The resulting picture is one of institutional complexity and polyarchy, in which political authority is dispersed and shared across levels and instances of policy-making.

**Technocratic politics**

The notion of polyarchic institutional networks implies forms of coordination different from “command and obedience” suggested by Waltz for the domestic realm as well as from the mere structure of “coordination” attested to the international sphere (see above). The term “governance” has come to coin a form of interaction that departs both from the notion of hierarchical authority inherent in “government” and from the voluntarism implied in the term coordination (Jachtenfuchs, 2001).

As defined by Adrienne Héritier and Martin Rhodes, governance incorporates a new style of decision making that is heavily dependent on nonhierarchical and mutually interdependent relationships along with a novel problem-solving style aimed at building consensus (Héritier & Rhodes, 2010).

The modes of interaction underlined in the governance literature thus imply low degrees of conflict or, at least, the capacity to circumvent conflict by excluding contentious issues from the agenda or framing them in more consensual terms. Horizontal coordination in the absence of coercion presupposes a degree of agreement among the participants that is alien to earlier more confrontational notions of politics. Politics thus become mutually negotiated, and based on the development of common understandings. One feature sustaining this approach is the notion that the original distinction between the subjects and the objects of political steering is dissolved (Mayntz, 2005). Those who decide on the policy are, at the same time, often also those who shall implement it in practice: whether they are regulators in public administrations who liaise across borders or private actors engaged in standard-setting. Therefore, their consent to the rule is, to some extent, intrinsic to the cooperation. This understanding is very much shared by the IR literature on transgovernmental governance that emphasizes the professional commonalities among participants and the shared problem-solving orientation as motors of cooperation (i.a. Slaughter, 2004).

This consensual notion of politics is, to some extent, also at the basis of social-constructivist variants of PA and IR that underline the role of advocacy coalitions, epistemic communities, and norm-entrepreneurs in the diffusion of political ideas and rules (e.g. Sabatier, 1996; Haas, 2001; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998).

While the term “technocratic” politics may be associated with an antidemocratic, pejorative tone, it is used here to underline a more pragmatic, problem- and consensus-oriented mode of political interaction that contrasts with interest- or value-based contestation. This notion of politics is also reflected the way “policy” is conceived of in this literature.

**Policy as regulation**

Studies that marry PA and IR approaches through the governance lens tend to address policies from a regulatory angle, emphasizing the functionalist quest for problem-solving rather than the underlying conflicts over tangible or intangible goods that surround these choices. This tendency to approach policy problems from a regulatory approach is perhaps most manifest in EU studies. In the 1990s, the notion of the “regulatory state” was devised to characterize the EU’s approach to policy-making (Majone, 1994). “Soft” modes of coordination dubbed “new modes of governance” entered EU policy-making especially regarding intricate issues with strong distributive or redistributive implications. The notion of “multi-level governance” was first introduced by Gary Marks in the study of EU policy-making in the field of cohesion policy through the Structural Funds (Hooghe & Marks, 2003; Marks, 1993). Research on “new modes of

\(^5\)Since its emergence in the 1990s, the notion of governance has become ubiquitous in political science research and different phases of governance research can be distinguished. For an overview see Rhodes (2012).
governance” drew inspiration from the fields of monetary, employment, or social policy, for which elements of the “open method of coordination” had been introduced (Héritier & Rhodes, 2010). Distributive and redistributive issues were thus not eliminated from policy-making, but they became transformed into more technical and tractable sub-questions that could be dealt with in regulatory and process-oriented terms rather than through more politicized political bargains.

These debates in EU studies resonate with the literature on the regulatory state that postulates an “increasingly rule-based, technocratic and juridical approach to economic governance, in which there is a greater emphasis on institutional self-regulation” (Phillips, 2006, p. 24). This approach embraces the idea to depoliticize governance through stronger reliance on institutions operating at arm’s length from government, insulated from daily political pressures and embedding their decisions in technical expertise (Yeung, 2010; Majone, 1994, 1997). IR scholars applying this understanding to the European Union or international organizations have argued that these “agents” only fulfill regulatory functions that have been delegated by their principals, the states. As long as these supranational/international bodies do not engage beyond the sphere of regulation—which these authors tend to assume—and thus do not raise distributive or redistributive issues, they can be sufficiently legitimized via the efficiency of their policy output (e.g. Keohane, Macedo, & Moravcsik, 2009; Majone, 1998; Moravcsik, 2002). Similar arguments sustain the delegation of authority to independent regulatory agencies in the domestic realm (e.g. Thatcher, 2002).

In sum, one can say that PA and IR have converged around a neo-institutionalist governance agenda that highlights the polyarchic and networked structure of political authority (polity), emphasizes technocratic, voluntary processes of political interaction (politics), and is akin to a regulatory understanding of public policy. In the following, we address some of the limitations implied in this particular path of convergence between PA and IR and explore the “edges” of governance approaches in political science.

**Constrictive harmony?**

When looking back, the marriage of IR with PA seems to have been spurred by the liberal optimism of the late 1980s through the early 2000s. In this period, the transformation of national governance away from hierarchical government met with a wave of unprecedented international integration, at least in the northern hemisphere. Today’s international context has changed, new “boundaries” (Windhoff-Hérétier, 1987) emerge that challenge some of the understandings upon which the two sub-disciplines had met. In the following, we discuss three themes that challenge the current boundaries of governance research: the institutional prerequisites for governance research; the notion of institutional polyarchy and its more or less horizontal understanding of public/hybrid and private governance presuppose a particular configuration of the state, the administration, and society that cannot be taken for granted. In particular, three preconditions stand out: the functional differentiation of the bureaucracy; the shadow of hierarchy; and an active and organized public sphere.

**Institutional prerequisites**

The notion of institutional polyarchy and its more or less horizontal understanding of public/hybrid and private governance presuppose a particular configuration of the state, the administration, and society that cannot be taken for granted. In particular, three preconditions stand out: the functional differentiation of the bureaucracy; the shadow of hierarchy; and an active and organized public sphere.

**Bureaucratic differentiation**

The horizontal focus of new modes of governance including coordination among transgovernmental actors presupposes a degree of internal differentiation and bureaucratic empowerment that is not so familiar beyond the circle of OECD countries. In other words, what Anne-Marie Slaughter has eloquently referred to as the “disaggregated state” with its subcomponents entering into relatively independent transnational linkages cannot be generalized.

Studies of EU endeavors to promote its acquis communautaire to neighboring countries in eastern Europe or the Mediterranean have shown that EU’s attempts to establish direct links between technocrats in the Commissions’ Directorates General or regulatory agencies with public administrations in Ukraine, Moldova, Morocco, or Tunisia have met with challenges (Lavenex, Lehmkul, & Wichmann, 2009). In particular, the highly centralized Southern Mediterranean regimes have preferred to interact at the formal diplomatic level with the EU rather than through transgovernmental links. As a result, meetings of so-called technical subcommittees, normally composed of higher administrators in the respective national ministries, have been attended by official state representatives and diplomats rather than bureaucrats (Lavenex, Lehmkul, & Wichmann, 2009, p. 820). With the eastern European neighbors, technocratic outreach has been easier. Here, however, EU officials have met with these countries’ limited administrative capacity to partake physically and/or actively in the respective framework. For instance, analyses of transboundary water cooperation with the Eastern neighbors have shown not only that some countries lack...
the personnel and resources to attend relevant transgovernmental meetings, but also that when attendance takes place, these bureaucrats often lack the expertise and authority (competence) to participate actively (Commission, 2006; Economic Commission for Europe, 2007; Lavenex, 2008). Needless to say, the reemergence of violent conflict and the destabilization of governments all around the EU’s periphery just add to the difficulties.

The importance of domestic bureaucratic differentiation for new modes of governance has also been highlighted in the recent literature on transgovernmental cooperation. As pointed out by David Bach and Abraham Newman in an article on transgovernmentalism in securities and insurance regulation, “the prevailing model in many countries and sectors is still that regulatory authority is not delegated and is, instead, exercised by a ministry or other public body serving at the whim of elected officials or political leaders” (Bach & Newman, 2014, p. 8). At the same time, their research on the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) shows that a certain level of regulatory autonomy (including nonpartisan personnel rules, independent funding sources, budgetary autonomy, and leadership tenure that exceeds any single electoral term) is a precondition for the establishment of such cross-border links (ibid.).

Another finding of the IOSCO study is that while interdependence of domestic regulatory agencies in lead countries is a precondition for the establishment of transgovernmentalism, once established, transgovernmental networks proliferate and contribute to the diffusion of the institutional model of regulatory autonomy. IOSCO’s 1998 Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, a set of regulatory benchmarks, states that “the regulator [over a market] should be operationally independent,” it “should have adequate powers, proper resources and the capacity to perform its functions and exercise its powers,” and its staff “should observe the highest professional standards” (IOSCO 1998 quoted in Bach & Newman, 2014). As a consequence of this policy, many original IOSCO member institutions with less autonomy—such as central banks, stock exchanges, and finance ministries—have been superseded by newly created independent securities regulators modeled more or less on the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (Bach & Newman, 2014).

These findings are corroborated in other policy fields marked by cross-border transgovernmental regulation. In the field of competition policy, the establishment of the International Competition Network (ICN) goes hand-in-hand with the introduction of the corresponding domestic institutions in developing/emerging countries (e.g. Svetiev, 2013). This process of institutional diffusion has been remarkably rapid, with 104 mostly newly created competition agencies of more than 90 countries joining the ICN within less than 10 years. At the same time, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies ensuring market competition and limiting the states’ leeway for intervention and industrial policy has often gone along with important political conflicts that persist until today. The People’s Republic of China is a good example of the domestic institutional challenges involved with the proliferation of these new modes of governance. The introduction of a competition regime goes along with the empowerment of three different institutions, one division within the (internationally more integrated) Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), and two that are closer to the central government: the Price Supervision and Inspection and Anti-Monopoly Bureau (NDRC) and the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau (SAIC). While the three agencies have established a certain division of labor, their independence from central government varies. Given these circumstances, China is not yet integrated in the ICN (Svetiev & Wang, 2016).

**Shadow of hierarchy**

Research has highlighted that horizontal modes of governance almost always interact under a “shadow of hierarchy” (Boerzel & Risse, 2010; Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995; Scharpf, 1997). The “shadow of hierarchy” refers to the awareness that if needed and wanted, the state can issue and implement binding rules. This “shadow” is both an incitement for nonhierarchical regulations—in so far as the latter allows public regulators or private actors to preserve autonomy and flexibility—and a guarantor for their stability (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2008; Héritier & Rhodes, 2010).

This argument corroborates the finding of transgovernmentalism that such horizontal modes of cross-border coordination have been pioneered by independent regulatory authorities in highly regulated countries. The shadow of hierarchy is present in the act of delegation of power to these independent authorities and in the presence or otherwise of at least the possibility of legally binding domestic regulation. The shadow of hierarchy is however not only a precondition, but also a motor of transgovernmental linkage. Drawing on the literature on bureaucratic politics and bureaucratic autonomy, it has been argued that transgovernmental cooperation helps independent regulators minimize political interference in their affairs while building up their reputation and authority (Thatcher, 2002). This incentive is particularly strong for bureaucratic entities that already enjoy a certain level of autonomy (Bach &
Newman, 2014).⁶ These findings have implications for the conceptualization of transgovernmentalism and governance as horizontal, voluntary, noncoercive, and mainly spontaneous—self-induced—forms of coordination. They highlight the role of institutional asymmetries in the wider geographical context that call for closer attention to the power dynamics involved in these modes of governance.

**Ubiquity of power relations**

As argued above, governance-oriented PA/IR research has an implicit bias for voluntary and harmonious forms of political coordination. In addition, governance approaches suggest at least a formal equality among the partners, which is mirrored in the horizontal character of their interaction. They thus have a functionalist bias that tends to neglect or obfuscate the role of power relations in these interactions. The asymmetry of power and the ubiquity of different forms of domination are particularly salient when one moves this research beyond the OECD world.

The discussion of the institutional prerequisites of new modes of governance has indicated that in the majority of countries, the establishment of corresponding domestic regulatory structures has been very much induced by the outreach activities of “northern” regulators. As pointed out in an analysis of the Southern regulatory state, “in its Northern sites of origin, the idea of the regulatory state was an endogenous domestic political choice. It grew fairly organically out of local state-society relations, taking on adaptations to fit varying conditions. Southern political systems, in contrast, more commonly acquired independent regulatory agencies through the intervention of the North” … “promoting a specific and universal regulatory transplant” (Hochstettler, 2012, p. 263; see also Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2005; Badran, 2012; Dubash & Morgan, 2012).

This “universal regulatory transplant” is being promoted through both coercive and more co-optive means (on the different conceptions of power see Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Lavenex, 2014). On the coercive side, international financial institutions (in particular the IMF and World Bank) have coupled loans to economic restructuring programs involving privatization, liberalization, and deregulation through independent regulatory agencies (for instance in telecommunication or energy, see Dubash & Morgan, 2012). In Europe, the EU has promoted institutional reform in accession countries through the (coercive) incentive of accession conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005). In her review of Europeanization research “West” and “East”, Adrienne Héritier (2005) noted several particularities emerging from the application of Europeanization concepts to the question of EU enlargement that are echoed here: firstly, a stronger emphasis on the institutional requirements of Europeanization and, secondly, the unidirectional target of Europeanization “East” in contrast to its “two-way-street” in the “traditional” Europeanization “West” literature (Héritier, 2005).

The one-way promotion of policies and the accompanying institutional structures also occur through less-coercive forms of policy diffusion. In a more co-optive fashion, northern regulators themselves have engaged into horizontal outreach activities that breed and encourage the development of the corresponding structures in other countries. Research on EU external governance through the European Neighbourhood Policy has highlighted the endeavors to establish direct links among bureaucratic actors, thereby bypassing the more politicized level of formal intergovernmental relations (Lavenex, 2008; Lavenex & Wichmann, 2009; Freyburg et al., 2009, 2011). Interestingly, this attempt at “functionalist extension” (Lavenex, 2014) not just applies to the usual field of economic regulatory policies. Realizing its constriction to exert coercion in fields like immigration control or energy, the EU—or better public officials in national administrations, Commission Directorates, and pertinent EU agencies (notably Frontex)—has engaged in similar forms of network building for the purpose of rule transfer. As noted above, this technocratic outreach has been challenged by the centralized, semi-authoritarian state structures in target countries. As a consequence, activities have focused more strongly on capacity and institution-building in order to create appropriate “partners” in transgovernmental policy transfer.

The observation of “one-way” governance is not limited to studies of EU enlargement and neighborhood policies. Analyses of cooperation comprising both advanced regulatory systems and more “junior” ones show that transgovernmental networks act as venues through which leading regulators can “push their vision of sector best practices” (Bach & Newman, 2010; Raustiala, 2002). This observation corresponds to the analysis of new modes of governance in the context of the EU neighborhood policy. Cooperation in technical subcommittees and other inter-administrative networks

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⁶In addition, Bach and Newman propose that a jurisdiction’s incentive to join will vary with the importance of the sector in the domestic economy. The larger the domestic industry in question, the more domestic market participants have a stake in and are affected by global rules, and, therefore, the greater their interest in ensuring their jurisdiction gets involved in international regulatory efforts (ibid.).
with the Eastern European and Southern Mediterranean partners clearly focused on the promotion of EU and Member States’ templates, even if the official mandate of the relevant fora, such as for instance transboundary water commissions, was to promote the exchange of information and best practices among all parties. This finding contrasts with the analysis of equivalent fora comprising EU/member states’ officials and Western neighbors (in particular Norway and Switzerland) who were much more able to influence the course of cooperation (Lavenex, 2008, 2015).

Attention to the subtle forms of influence surrounding new modes of governance in IR deserves a reconceptualization of the traditional understandings of power. In contrast to the exercise of conditionality by the IFIs or in EU enlargement policy, technocratic outreach at the transgovernmental level engages “softer” and less-tangible forms of power based on the capacity to lead by attraction (Nye, 2011) and to sidetrack politically conflictual issues. As pointed out by early functionalists, transgovernmental settings are particularly conducive to cooperation because they “call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for cooperation, while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition” (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Mittrany, 1943–1966, p. 108). Transgovernmental ties thus exert a subtle “institutional” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 51f), “productive” (ibid.: 55f), and “co-optive” (Nye, 2011) influence that rests primarily in the familiarization and gradual involvement in EU policies and institutional templates (Lavenex, 2014) and the shaping of shared conceptions of appropriate governance. In contrast to coercive power, this type of influence is more diffuse and does not directly hinge on the EU’s (or other dominant actors) superior material resources:

Spatially, A’s actions affect the behavior or conditions of others only through institutional arrangements such as decisional rules, formalized lines of responsibility, divisions of labor, and structures of dispersed dependence; power is no longer a matter of A’s direct effect on B, but works instead through socially extended, institutionally diffuse relations. (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 51)

In addition, transgovernmental outreach also has an epistemic dimension that corresponds to Barnett and Duvall’s notion of productive power. This second type of diffuse influence affects ideational perceptions of the “normal” and “appropriate” forms of political organization. Productive power is thus defined as the “social processes and the systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed” (ibid.: 55). This diffusion of knowledge and perceptions is corroborated by educational systems: “the flow of new ideas to the state […] emerge from think tanks, universities, and governmental labs” (Haas, 2001, p. 11582). Studies have shown that future elites who had been trained in US/Western universities were instrumental in promoting neoliberal reforms and the introduction of institutions compatible with our understanding of the regulatory state in Latin American countries and elsewhere (e.g. Babb, 2004). This form of ideational influence is further perpetuated, even if less intensively, through diverse curricular and training activities offered by Western administrations (i.a. the EU’s Twinning / TAIEX programs and other knowledge transfer projects), international organizations, and transgovernmental networks themselves (such as the different teaching modules of the ICN).

The power dynamics involved in the extension of governance frameworks across borders follow different rationales. The PA/IR marriage has tended to explain the emergence of transgovernmentalism and other forms of horizontal coordination according to a functionalist logic, highlighting their higher adequacy to address situations of uncertainty or their capacity to mobilize expertise needed for complex challenges. This interpretation is particularly salient in the “experimentalist” version of the new modes of governance literature (Sabel & Zeitlin, 2010; Zeitlin, 2015). The active promotion in other countries of bureaucratic structures enabling the latter to participate in new modes of governance however points at a genuinely political logic. This political logic is driven by the regulatory interests and bureaucratic self-understanding of the leading regulators and sometimes by broader political considerations, such as in the European neighborhood policy the desire to stabilize countries by making them more similar to the EU (Lavenex, 2015). Paying attention to power dynamics also alerts us of the limits of this kind of externally induced governance change. As many studies have shown, the resulting institutional “transplants” emulate their northern templates in formal terms, but not really in practice. Frequently, newly created bureaucratic structures remain empty shells, or they rapidly become “embedded in local conditions and relations in ways that have eventually made the Southern regulatory state also quite variable in practice” (Hochstetler, 2012, p. 263).

**Beyond policy as regulation**

As argued above, the marriage between PA and IR focusing on the phenomenon of cross-border governance has tended to concentrate on relatively unproblematic “coordination problems” where parties share an interest in cooperation and expect little (re)distributive implications. Even when the problem constellation as such is not explained, governance approaches often attest a rational problem-solving style in political interaction. Implicitly or
explicitly this literature assumes that “Horizontal co-ordination should also be the preferred option where policy externalities generate a benefit from ... co-ordination but where incentives to defect are relatively low so that no hierarchical enforcement mechanisms are needed” (Borrás & Radaelli, 2010, p. 53ff.).

Whether due to the causes sustaining horizontal modes of governance or due to a certain selection bias of the PA/IR literature, the result is that the latter has tended to project a “fair-weather” picture of IR, perhaps sometimes overestimating technocratic/functionalist rationalities and paying less attention to conflicts about the values, inequalities, and legitimacy surrounding the policy changes they study.

The role of values and ideas
Analyses studying the transfer of western policies and concepts to the developing world repeatedly stress the profound ideological cleavages and conflicts between domestic elites surrounding the introduction of corresponding (usually neoliberal) reforms in formerly state-interventionist /developmentalist economies (i.a. Wade, 1993; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Clearly, the decision to liberalize trade, to introduce competition and intellectual protection regimes (for instance) is not only one of regulation but a decision about values and basic understandings on the role of the state in the economy. This decision about values also has immediate redistributive implications as it creates winners and losers of the new regulations. Similarly, the decision to develop border regimes and control immigration is not only about “managing” flows of people but also affects the balance between rights, freedom, and security in a society (Lavenex & Wagner, 2007). A recent study of OECD policy transfer to Brazil, China, Indonesia, and South Africa argues that differences in societal values and identities (in their terminology: degree of “Westernness”) have an important impact on the question of whether these policies become adopted or not (Clifton & Díaz-Fuentes, 2014). In sum, it seems that what could be a rather technical regulatory issue in some countries—because of an underlying ideological consensus—is much more complex and contested in other countries. Knowledge about local cultures and ideas and sensitivity for the cleavages surrounding political choice cannot be taken for granted but need to become objects of investigation themselves.

How democratic?
The governance agenda in PA and IR studies has been paralleled by normative debates about the diversification of forms of democratic legitimacy. In addition to traditional notions of representative or liberal democracy, new concepts have proliferated, including notions of deliberative, participatory, associative, egalitarian, or consensual democracy. While very diverse, the new conceptions of democracy have in common that they put less emphasis on the idea of universal representation of a given demos through central institutions and emphasize more the genesis of legitimacy through stakeholder participation, procedural justice, peer accountability, or output legitimacy. While doing justice to this rich literature would require a much deeper discussion, there is a certain tendency in some of this literature to legitimize networked modes of governance in their own right, therefore putting less attention to the broader picture of the different sources of democratic legitimacy and their interplay.

Traditionally, the functionalist stance in IR cooperation theory has conceived of international institutions as instruments established by states in order to facilitate Pareto-efficient cooperation by reducing transaction costs and monitoring state compliance (Keohane, 1984). Apart from their focus on issue-specific regulatory policies, which primarily tackle conflicts about interests that are relatively contained (Lowi, 1964), the legitimacy of international institution was derived from the act of delegation. Democratic legitimacy was not in question since this delegation was clearly delimited and resulted from a democratically legitimated act in the national constituencies.

Clearly, the empowerment of international institutions and their reach “behind-the-border” put limit on this traditional model of delegation. In this context, some scholars have tended to see horizontal modes of governance as a potential solution to the “governance dilemma” that consists in reconciling functional pressure for more integration—also beyond the sphere of pareto-optimal regulations—with national sovereignty and democracy (Eberlein & Newman, 2008). Indeed, soft law coordination does not yield supranational authority that would constrain the sovereignty of the domestic democratic institutions. Such horizontal coordination is less sensitive to legitimacy concerns than the vertical transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions (Idema & Kelemen, 2006, p. 117). In so far as governance fora do reach beyond purely regulatory matters and affect questions over values and justice, however, their legitimacy can no longer be derived from an act of delegation stemming from a democratically legitimated government alone—or, in the case of the EU, from a double delegation from governments to the Commission to the independent regulators. In the absence of a transnational demos, the

7See for instance the Varieties of Democracy Project at http://kellogg.nd.edu/projects/vdem/.
anchoring of networked regulators in their respective domestic constitutional systems deserves more attention (Cheneval, Lavenex, & Schimmelfennig, 2015). Once again, Adrienne Héritier’s work has pioneered these questions when she emphasized the need to broaden our analytical perspectives to grasp instances of “composite democracy” in processes of “policy-making without legislating” (Héritier, 2002).

Conclusion

The governance concept has travelled far in political science; it has moved from domestic PA to European studies and global public goods and has married originally distinct subdisciplines, among which are PA and IR. Adrienne Héritier has been a pioneer in this journey. While her empirical curiosity has constantly led her to explore new horizons, the concepts she has developed to analyze these moving targets have drawn inspiration from the various subfields of political science, identifying common grounds where previous scholarship propagated disruptive boundaries, and combining related concepts in creative ways. There are few scholars of whom one can say that their work has been cutting edge, and not only once, but for several decades. Indeed one is tempted to say that Adrienne’s work has evolved on the edge of the discipline, constantly pushing it forward.

Shifting the geographic focus to regions that have hitherto been less explored through the governance lens, and highlighting the inspiration taken from Adrienne Héritier’s work for my own and related research, this article has sought to pinpoint three avenues moving the “governance agenda” beyond its current horizons: the need to reflect on the institutional prerequisites for governance; to specify the modes of power and domination embedded therein; and to address the wider normative questions beyond governance as regulation. Maybe these avenues will take us to contexts where we won’t be able use the term “governance” anymore. For sure, however, the combination of PA and IR will lead us the way to their understanding.

References


